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In late October, a series of last-minute attempts to salvage the Governors Island accord failed,
as ongoing political violence impeded Haitian legislators from meeting to vote on bills called for
in the agreement. Under terms of the accord, signed in July by ousted President Jean Bertrand
Aristide and army chief Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras, the parliament was to approve several pieces of
key legislation before Oct. 30, including an amnesty covering those involved in the coup d'etat.
The legislative paralysis has in turn led to non-compliance with other provisions of the Governors
Island accord, most important the resignation of Cedras and Port-au-Prince police chief Col. Michel
Francois (see NotiSur 10/29/93). Governors Island accord collapses Once the Oct. 30 deadline for
Aristide's return to Haiti had passed, widespread confusion set in as to the status of the Governors
Island accord itself, since the agreement contained no provision for extension beyond the deadline.
The UN Security Council on Oct. 30 approved a resolution reiterating its support for Aristide's
reinstatement and asserting that the Governors Island accord remained in force. "The Council
continues to insist on full and unconditional compliance" with the agreement, stated the resolution.
In Haiti, however, the military and right-wing political parties moved quickly to further scuttle the
accord and definitively block any possibility of Aristide's return. In a radio interview broadcast Oct.
29, Cedras had declared that only with his consent could the Governors Island accord have any
validity beyond the 30th. Meanwhile, in an Oct. 30 communique, a coalition of 12 political parties
and organizations said they would give Aristide until 3 pm the following day to resign. The groups
added that they planned to pursue enforcement of article 149 of the Haitian constitution, which
states that in the case of a prolonged presidential absence, a provisional president shall be selected
from among the justices of the Supreme Court and new elections held within three months. The
coalition also demanded the resignation of Cedras and removal of the chief negotiator behind the
Governors Island accord, UN special envoy Dante Caputo. The groups included the Front for the
Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), a military-backed political organization; the Alliance
for the Liberation of Haiti (ALHA), headed by Reynold Georges; the Haitian Party of God (PARADI),
led by Vladimir Jeanty; the Christian Democrat Party (PDCH), headed by Marie-France Claude
and Joachim Pierre; and the Mobilization for National Development Party (MDN), headed by
Hubert de Ronceray. For his part, Caputo angrily rejected the demands, indicating that any move
to permanently replace Aristide would be seen by the UN Security Council as a grave violation
of the accord. Caputo warned that any such move would result in the immediate imposition of
tougher sanctions. In Washington, the State Department issued a statement reaffirming the Clinton
administration's commitment to Aristide's return and stating that the possibility of holding new
elections to pick a replacement "is not on the table." In the meantime, the increasingly severe
shortage of gasoline has clearly frustrated the military and its supporters. Effects of the oil embargo
could been seen throughout the country, as extensive electricity rationing went into effect and
vehicle traffic dropped off substantially. The FRAPH organized and enforced a strike throughout
Port-au-Prince Oct. 29 and again on Nov. 4 in an attempt to pressure the government to force
gas stations to sell fuel. Strike leaders also demanded the resignation of the interim government
headed by Prime Minister Robert Malval. Against this backdrop, on Nov. 9 and 10, a Port-auPrince judge issued rulings requiring Esso, Shell and Texaco to release their existing stocks of
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gasoline within 24 hours. Spokespersons from the oil companies indicated they had no intention of
complying with the orders, since they were compelled to adhere to the UN-imposed oil embargo.
Efforts to hold additional talks fail Caputo has issued a call for a new round of talks aimed at
salvaging the Governors Island accord and obtaining some measure of military compliance. In
support of this effort, Washington increased its pressure on the Haitian military by sending an
additional US warship carrying 650 Marines to join the 11 ships from the US, Canada and Britain
comprising the naval blockade around the island to enforce the UN embargo. According to the
State Department, the Marines were prepared to evacuate US citizens and Aristide supporters
if their safety is threatened. At a meeting convened on Nov. 3, Haitian legislators, members of
Malval's cabinet, and foreign diplomats waited in vain for military representatives to show up
for talks. Two days later, another attempt to get a dialogue off the ground was canceled after the
military made it clear they had no intention of participating. Given the military boycott of talks,
the Malval government and UN, OAS, and US officials launch a new search for solutions to the
crisis. On Nov. 8, a delegation that included five of Malval's cabinet members flew to Washington to
meet with Aristide to search for mechanisms to break the stalemate. Malval, meanwhile, met at his
home in Port-au- Prince with US Ambassador to Haiti William Swing and with John Peter Leonard,
director of the State Department's Caribbean Affairs office. Caputo as well held meetings in New
York with UN Secretary General Butros Butros Ghali and then in Washington with OAS Secretary
General Joao Baena Soarez and with Aristide. Washington left with few options In the face of the
Haitian military's intransigence, US policy makers have found themselves left with few options.
Moreover, the Clinton administration is generally seeking alternatives with the lowest political
costs, thus limiting the options available. For example, Aristide, Caputo, and members of the US
congressional Black Caucus have supported the imposition of a complete trade embargo against
Haiti, rather than just continue the partial sanctions now in force. But the Clinton administration
has opposed the proposal, largely due to fear that such a move would provoke a massive wave
of Haitian refugees to the US. Instead, officials in Washington have tried to rally support for a
series of carefully targeted measures, including the freezing of assets held abroad and revoking
the US visas of military officers and politicians who have blocked Aristide's return. According to a
State Department official, "We want the people running the show to suffer, not those who live at
the bottom of the heap already. They have bank accounts all over, and houses, too, and they like
to fly off for elaborate vacations. Maybe this will give them second thoughts without punishing
the average Haitian." Many question the effectiveness of such measures, however, since Haitian
military leaders and members of the political and economic elite clearly already took steps months
ago to protect their assets abroad. In a series of public statements in early November, Secretary of
State Warren Christopher attempted to downplay the importance of Haiti as a US foreign policy
priority, although he insisted that Washington nevertheless remains committed to seeking Aristide's
return to power. On Nov. 7, President Clinton refused to rule out the possibility of a US military
invasion of Haiti to restore the ousted President. On NBC's Meet the Press, Clinton declared, "They
[Aristide and his supporters] have not asked for that, but I don't think we should rule anything in or
out." Asked whether a total embargo against Haiti is possible, Clinton replied, "That is an option.
But I also hope that the other wealthy nations of the world that have assets deposited from those
Haitians who are keeping democracy from returning will join us in freezing their assets." On Nov.
9, Aristide rejected any possibility that he would resign or would convoke new elections as a way
to break the current impasse. "My resignation would be the best way to kill democracy," he said.
Aristide emphasized that Clinton had not rejected the possibility of a military intervention, saying
"I'm sure the Haitian people would be happy to be free of the criminals, but if I request a military
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intervention I would be violating the constitution." Although still hoping to resolve the Haitian
crisis without a direct US military intervention, US officials are nonetheless aware of the negative
effects on the population of the current policy and the dangers inherent in delaying resolution of
the conflict. Above all, concern over a possible repetition of last year's wave of some 50,000 Haitian
boat people has become a major factor in the administration's calculations. This fear was further
compounded in the wake of a recently-released study by the Harvard Center for Population and
Development Studies titled "Sanctions in Haiti: Crisis in Humanitarian Action." According to the
Center's director, Dr. Lincoln Chen, economic hardships resulting from the sanctions are causing
the deaths of as many as 1,000 Haitian children each month. The sanctions have also resulted in
about 100,000 new cases of moderate to severe malnutrition. The report concludes that, "the human
toll from the silent tragedy of humanitarian neglect has been far greater than either the violence or
human rights abuses" which have affected Haiti since Aristide's overthrow in September of 1991.
State Department spokesperson David Johnson acknowledged the harsh effects of sanctions on
the Haitian population. "Sanctions are by their very nature a blunt instrument, but they remain
the best tool we have at our disposal to bring about the return of democracy in Haiti." The White
House later issued a statement calling into question the methodology used in compiling the Center's
report. Administration fears of a refugee crisis were further piqued on Nov. 9 when the Haitian
Front of Popular and Union Organizations (FOPS) issued a call for Haitians to emigrate en masse
to the US if the international community fails to resolve the Haitian crisis within 15 days. The FOPS
communique stated, "The international community is responsible for the crisis and for maintaining
a posture of lies with respect to the Haitian people." The group specifically criticized the US,
France and Venezuela for failing to fulfill their commitments. The group added, "If they want to
see us die here, they're wrong, we're going to die in the US." Meanwhile, the US policy of forcibly
repatriating Haitian refugees intercepted at sea continues in force. Aristide's Washington advisor
Michael Barnes has forcefully protested the policy: "Clearly, it's tragic to see the United States
government unloading these people on a dock in a country where we say it's not safe to send US
marines." (Sources: Deutsche Press Agentur, 11/01/93; Inter Press Service, 10/28-30/93, 11/01/93,
11/03/93, 11/05/93; Notimex, 10/29-31/93, 11/02/93, 11/04/93, 11/05/93; Reuter, 11/03/93, 11/06/93,
11/07/93; New York Times, 10/30/93, 11/01/93, 11/02-06/93, 11/09/93; Spanish news service EFE,
10/29-11/04/93, 11/07-10/93; Associated Press, 10/29-11/06/93, 11/08/93, 11/10/93; Agence FrancePresse, 10/29-11/10/93)
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